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The Costs and Benefits of Affordable Housing:  
A Partial Solution to the Conflict of Competing Goods 
 
Michael Diamond*  
 
In this Article, I extend a prior inquiry into the costs borne by society due to 
the lack of enough decent, affordable housing units. I previously outlined those 
costs and suggested a combination of public cost savings and public and private 
benefits that would accrue by providing that housing. I posited that the savings 
and benefits, in the aggregate, could at least substantially offset the costs and 
might even exceed them. If that is so, I queried, why has society not produced the 
needed units? In answering that question, I offered several possible responses: 
inadequate resources, racism, and public choice opposition. 
In this Article, I examine the lack of resources in the context of what I have 
called “the conflict of competing goods.” This conflict arises when there are a 
variety of public goods to be obtained but insufficient resources to maximize them 
all. The questions then are how does society choose among them and how ought it 
do so? I attempt to answer these questions by reverting to a form of evaluation 
espoused by economists and certain politicians—Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). 
While I do not accept CBA as the appropriate model for many types of 
evaluations, I use it here to support an argument that society should provide more 
affordable housing units. I attempt to identify the costs of the absence of such 
housing in relation to the benefits of providing it in an effort to enhance the other 
arguments—morality, equity, etc.—that underlie my own view of the problem. 
Thus, if the hypothesis is correct—that affordable housing can, essentially, pay for 
itself, the conflict of competing goods can be substantially, although not entirely, 
reduced. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article involves a summary of the problem, including the costs, of an 
inadequate supply of decent, affordable housing. It goes on to describe the Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) methodology and to criticize its use in certain situations. 
Nevertheless, I go on to propose a method for the financing and production of 
significantly more affordable housing consistent with the application of CBA to 
the problem. There are in our society several social needs that most people, 
regardless of political affiliations, would say ought to be filled. Better healthcare, 
education, and housing, for example, are among them.1 There are differences of 
                                                                                                                         
1. See Public Opinion Research, HOUSING TRUST FUND PROJECT, 
https://housingtrustfundproject.org/campaigns/making-your-case/messages-that-work/public-opinion-research 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020); Poll: The Public Overwhelmingly Believes Housing Affordability Should Be a 
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https://www.opportunityhome.org/pollpressrelease (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
opinion about how those needs should be filled, but not as much debate about the 
desirability of their being filled. Much of the debate relates to the priority of needs. 
When a society has insufficient resources to achieve all the social goods about 
which there is a strong consensus, the society must make choices about how to 
prioritize them. I have called this problem “the conflict of competing goods.”2 
There is a good deal of research and scholarly writing on how society makes these 
choices, but little on how it ought to do so. This Article revisits the conflict of 
competing goods using the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring3 as a catalyst. 
Olmstead dealt with the anti-discrimination provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).4 The case was brought by two individuals, each of whom 
had voluntarily admitted themselves to Georgia’s state mental facilities.5 Each had 
subsequently been found by their respective treatment teams to be a good candidate 
for treatment in then-existing community-based mental health programs.6 Each, 
however, was not placed in such a facility and remained confined in state 
institutions.7 They sued the state of Georgia, claiming a violation of the anti-
discrimination provisions contained in Title II of the ADA. 
Georgia argued there was inadequate funding to accommodate the plaintiffs’ 
requests.8 The state claimed it was using all available funds to provide services to 
other disabled persons and, therefore, it was not discriminating against the 
plaintiffs based on their disabilities.9 The lower courts held the lack of funding did 
not excuse the failure to place the plaintiffs in available community treatment 
facilities.10 The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that “[u]njustified 
isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.” 11 
However, the Court also accepted Georgia’s financial defense theory. The Court 
held, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg:  
[W]e recognize, as well, the States’ need to maintain a range of 
facilities for the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental 
disabilities, and the States’ obligation to administer services with 
an even hand. Accordingly, we further hold that the Court of 
Appeals’ remand instruction was unduly restrictive. In evaluating 
                                                               
Top National Priority; Expects Congress and President to Take Major Action, Opportunity Starts at Home, 
2. See Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A Policy 
Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin 
Paul Molloy eds., 2009). 
3. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.”). 
5. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 594. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. at 595.  
11. Id. at 597. 
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a State’s fundamental-alteration defense, the District Court must 
consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only 
the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but 
also the range of services the State provides others with mental 
disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out those services 
equitably.12 
The holding, while recognizing the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the 
discrimination that existed, moderates those rights based on the financial capacity 
of the state to comply. Justice Kennedy, in a partially concurring opinion, aptly 
framed the issue: 
No State has unlimited resources, and each must make hard 
decisions on how much to allocate to treatment of diseases and 
disabilities. If, for example, funds for care and treatment of the 
mentally ill, including the severely mentally ill, are reduced in 
order to support programs directed to the treatment and care of 
other disabilities, the decision may be unfortunate. The judgment 
is, however, a political one.13 
Olmstead’s attempt to fashion a practical response to the questions presented 
raises two serious theoretical questions. The first implicates the conflict of 
competing goods—in Olmstead, the conflict between non-discrimination and 
mental health services. The second concerns the interrelationship between several 
social goods in which the improvement in one creates improvements in others—in 
Olmstead, the savings to be derived from moving patients from an institutional 
setting to a community one. These improvements might result in the government 
avoiding a variety of public costs and in the creation of social benefits sufficient, 
in the aggregate, to pay for the improvement. Such an outcome might lessen the 
quandary of having to choose among competing goods. 
If such savings and benefits could be achieved by making a social investment, 
why are such investments not made? This question relates to the conflict of 
competing goods in several ways. First, the social investment could result in 
achieving a valued social good at limited net expenditure of resources. Second, 
while it may lessen the quandary of prioritization of competing goods, it does not, 
as I will discuss in Part III, below, eliminate it. 
                                                                                                                         
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
I should say at this point that I am not an expert in disability law or in 
discrimination under the ADA. In fact, I know only what the reasonably well-read 
layperson knows about these important issues. My participation in this discussion 
derives more from my prior explorations of how a society with finite resources 
ought to prioritize allocation of those resources. In pursuing this question, I have 
previously examined the net effects of certain kinds of public expenditures to 
determine why some such investments might not have been made, even where they 
could result in a counterbalancing set of costs avoided or benefits gained. My goal 
in this Article is to continue that examination. 
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Assuming the benefits I allude to are demonstrable, there are several additional 
issues that need to be addressed. For example, since not all the benefits to be 
derived from providing additional housing will inure directly to the government, 
how does the public capture the private benefit? Should the direct governmental 
savings inure to the agencies that produced the housing? Each of the governmental 
agencies involved in areas where benefits have accrued might argue that the 
proceeds from these benefits ought to be allocated to them. They might rightly 
argue that not all the societal goals in their particular field have been met and there 
are insufficient total resources available to meet them. The conflict of competing 
goods, redux.  
These are among the questions that can be seen as presented by the Olmstead 
opinion. The Court permits the state’s claim of lack of sufficient resources to place 
the plaintiffs in a community facility to override the plaintiffs’ statutory right to 
such a placement, a right that the Court recognizes in Olmstead.14 This overriding 
of the plaintiffs’ right occurs despite the fact that placing them in community 
facilities would likely be less costly than continuing their confinement in state 
facilities.15 The several opinions in Olmstead thus offer the opportunity to re-
examine in context the two questions I posed earlier concerning the choice between 
competing social goods and the method by which the government might recapture 
and repurpose the benefits derived from making a particular choice. 
Part II summarizes the argument that by providing additional affordable 
housing for the benefit of low-income households there will be significant cost 
savings to the government along with significant benefits to individual households 
and to society as a whole. I will also suggest some reasons why, assuming my 
working hypothesis is correct, society nonetheless fails to provide such housing. 
Part III discusses the concept of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the difficulty of 
measuring the public benefit derived from certain types of social investments. I 
will also discuss the ways in which some of the non-governmental benefits can be 
quantified and monetized, and the fact that many of the resulting benefits cannot, 
or should not, be monetized. Part III will conclude with a discussion of various 
critiques of CBAs as applied to social investments. Part IV discusses the 
investment in additional affordable housing in relation to CBA. I reprise the 
problem of the conflict of competing goods and discuss how it relates to the 
allocation decisions discussed in Part III. This includes a discussion of government 
capture of some of the private benefit derived from additional affordable housing. 
I conclude with some final thoughts about the relationship of CBAs to affordable 
housing and to the conflict of competing goods. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
                                                                                                                         
14. Id. at 597. 
15. Id. at 595, 607. 
The United States faces a severe shortage of decent housing that is affordable 
to lower-income residents. For the most vulnerable households, the deficit in 
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affordable and available housing approximates eight million units.16 
ANDREW AURAND ET AL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2 (2017), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-Report_2017.pdf (estimating that in 2017, there was a national 
shortage of 7.4 million affordable and available rental homes for extremely low-income renters alone). 
The effects of 
the housing deficit are well documented in academic literature. Indeed, I have 
explored the deficit at length in an earlier article.17 The impact of this deficit falls 
predominantly on low-income households that often are faced with the choice 
between living in sub-standard housing units, paying too high a percentage of their 
income towards housing costs, or doubling up with another household in order to 
manage the costs.18 The most extreme result of the deficit is homelessness. 
A. The Effects of the Housing Deficit 
In addition to these easily observable effects of the housing deficit, there are 
also secondary effects of the lack of adequate and affordable housing. These latter 
effects include poorer health outcomes, lower educational achievement, more 
involvement with the criminal justice system and incarceration, and lower 
productivity rates. What has been less recognized, at least in the legal literature, 
has been the cost to society that can be attributed to the affordable housing deficit. 
The costs of dealing with these effects through the use of Medicaid and Medicare, 
the courts, police, correctional officers, and prisons, along with the lost educational 
opportunities and work productivity, are borne by society as a whole.19  
My point is not that the lack of decent affordable housing accounts for all of 
these losses which, in the aggregate, are very large. There are many causes for poor 
health, low academic achievement, and loss of productivity, and causality between 
inadequate housing and these outcomes is difficult to show. Nevertheless, it is clear 
the lack of decent affordable housing is a major contributor to such problems.20 
MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
PLANNING & DEV., THE 2018 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 10–12 
(2018), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.  
In 
the next sections, I will describe the magnitude of the aggregate loss for various 
effects and suggest a framework to tie the losses to the affordable housing deficit. 
1. Homelessness
Perhaps the most recognizable effect of the housing deficit is homelessness. 
While not everyone who is homeless is so due to the housing deficit, a large 
percentage of homeless persons can be attributed to the absence of available 
affordable units.21 
See, e.g., NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF 
DATA AND CAUSES, https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2020); Homelessness in America, THE NAT’L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, 
https://nationalhomeless.org/about-homelessness (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
16 . 
Moreover, according to the United States Interagency Council 
on Homelessness, approximately “one-third of all people experiencing 
17. See Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing: Of Inefficiency, Market Distortion, and Government
Failure, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 979 (2019). 
18. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–5
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homelessness on a given night” are families with children. 22  
U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: FOCUS ON 




approximately 58,000 households, or 188,000 people total, of whom more than 
109,000 are children. 23  The costs of homelessness to the public have been 
estimated to be upwards of seventeen billion dollars per year.24 
In an appearance on The Daily Show, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan stated that “[t]he thing we 
finally figured out is that it’s actually, not only better for people, but cheaper to solve homelessness than it 
is to put a band-aid on it. . . . Because, at the end of the day, it costs, between shelters and emergency rooms 
and jails, it costs about $40,000 a year for a homeless person to be on the streets.” See Molly Moorhead, 
HUD Secretary Says a Homeless Person Costs Taxpayers $40,000 a Year, POLITIFACT (Mar. 12, 2012, 
3:59 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/mar/12/shaun-donovan/hud-
secretary-says-homeless-person-costs-taxpayers. Philip Mangano, the policy chief of President George W. 
Bush’s homelessness program, indicated that “the cost of keeping people on the street added up to between 
$35,000 and $150,000 per person per year.” Id. See also Malcom Gladwell, Million Dollar Murray, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 96, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/million-dollar-murray 
(providing a narrative presentation of part of one man’s life on the streets).  
This does not 
include lost opportunities to the public due to disrupted and incomplete educational 
attainment (and the long-term effects of those losses), lower employment (and 
lower-level employment), and losses in productivity (that is, workers producing 
less than they are capable of producing due to absenteeism and what is known as 
“presenteeism”25) by the victims of homelessness. These public losses do not 
include the suffering, both physical and emotional, of the homeless themselves and 
of their families. 
2. General Health 
The deleterious health effects of homelessness are obvious. They include such 
problems as exposure, violence, communicable diseases, malnutrition, substance 
abuse, and stress, the costs of which in both dollars and human suffering are 
overwhelming.26 But even for those who are housed, poor quality housing—and 
standard housing that is overcrowded or that commands too high a percentage of a 
household’s income—can lead to extremely negative health outcomes that have 
both public and private consequences. Substandard housing results in higher risks 
of illness 27  
DANNY FRIEDMAN, ECOTEC, SOCIAL IMPACT OF POOR HOUSING 14 (2010), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9406&rep=rep1&type=pdf (“The range of 
potential hazards include (among others), damp, mold, excess cold or heat, danger of fire, carbon 
monoxide, poor lighting, danger of falls, noise overcrowding and inadequate space, and structural integrity 
of the building. The type of risks to health stemming from these hazards include respiratory and asthmatic 
conditions, infections and other chest conditions, coronary disease and strokes, as well as fractures, burns, 
and a range of psychological and mental health conditions that can be exacerbated by poor conditions.”).
and injury. These are often due to poor construction or deferred 
maintenance, and, on occasion, to the adaptations of one building component to 
22




25. See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
26. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING: EVALUATING THE 
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING HEALTH OUTCOMES AMONG PEOPLE EXPERIENCING CHRONIC 
HOMELESSNESS 38–57 (2018); see also COMM. ON HEALTHCARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE, 
HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH, AND HUMAN NEEDS (1988). 
27. 
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make up for the absence of another, such as using a stove, oven, or space heaters to 
heat an apartment when there is no other source of heating.  
Even when housing meets code requirements for health and safety, it may create 
problems for low-income residents and for society. Many low-income residents are 
cost burdened, meaning that they pay more than thirty percent of their income for 
housing costs.28 A significant number of low-income households pay more than 
fifty percent of their income for housing, which means they are “severely” cost 
burdened. Either condition leaves households with too little of their already limited 
income available for other household needs such as healthcare and medications, 
wellness activities, and nutrition.29 
See NABIJAJ MAQBOOL ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON HEALTH: A 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2015), https://www.rupco.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/The-Impacts-of-
Affordable-Housing-on-Health-CenterforHousingPolicy-Maqbool.etal.pdf (“Families paying excessive 
amounts of their income for housing often have insufficient resources remaining for other essential needs, 
including food, medical insurance, and health care.”). 
Occasionally, the cost burden is the result of a 
household’s conscious choice to pay more in order to live in a better neighborhood 
with better housing, schools, and safety.30 In other situations, there is no real choice 
and people seek the cheapest reasonably available alternative. In an attempt to limit 
the cost burden, some households double up, thereby sharing the housing costs.31 
31. Laryssa Mykyta & Natasha Philkauskas, Does Doubling Up Improve Family Well-Being?, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 31, 2016) https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/research-
matters/2016/03/does-doubling-up-improve-family-well-being.html.  
This causes overcrowding with its concomitant problems for the housing unit and 
for the doubled up households who are often still left with a cost burden, albeit a 
smaller one.32 The health-related concerns include greater risks of communicable 
illnesses, added stress, and emotional problems due to overcrowding, lack of 
privacy, and noise. 
Finally, the absence of sufficient numbers of decent affordable housing units 
and the limited resources low-income households have to devote to housing costs 
creates what has been called “housing insecurity,” even among those who are 
housed. 33  
See, e.g., Robynn Cox et al., Measuring Population Estimates of Housing Insecurity in the United 
States: A Comprehensive Approach 1 (Dec. 19, 2017) (working paper series for the Washington Ctr. for 
Equitable Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/12192017-WP-measuring-
housing-insecurity.pdf.   
A less obvious consequence of housing insecurity and the resulting 
frequent changes of housing accommodations is the less stable access to social 
services and health care.34 
                                                               
28. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“[71%] of ELI [extremely low income] renter households 
are severely cost-burdened, spending more than half of their incomes on rent and utilities. These 8.1 million 
severely cost-burdened households account for 72.6% of all severely cost-burdened renter households in 
the U.S. . . . [33%] of very low income (VLI) renter households; 8.2% of low income (LI) renter 
households, and 2.4% of middle income (MI) renter households are severely cost-burdened.”). 
29 . 
                                                          
30. Sandra J. Newman, Does Housing Matter for Poor Families? A Critical Summary of Research 
and Issues Still to Be Resolved, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 895, 905 (2008). 
32. Id.  
33. 
34. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 5; see also, Diamond, supra note 2, at 1001–03. 
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3. Educational Losses 
Inadequate and unaffordable housing has a negative impact on the educational 
achievement of children, both directly and indirectly. 35  The lost educational 
accomplishment affects the individuals concerned, their families, and society. Less 
education equates with lower employment levels and lower lifetime income.36 This 
in turn results in lower tax revenue for every level of government and greater usage 
of public social services such as Medicaid, public assistance, and unemployment 
insurance. Lower educational attainment is also associated with more frequent 
interactions with the criminal justice and correctional systems.37 
4. Productivity Losses 
Society suffers when employees are absent from work or, less visibly, when 
employees show up for work but cannot perform to their full potential. The latter 
situation is known as “presenteeism” and accounts for a significant loss in 
productivity.38 
See, e.g., MAYO CLINIC HEALTH SOLUTIONS, THE TRUE COST OF POOR HEALTH 1 (2008), 
http://www.mywellbeingjourney.com/PDF/Marketing/Mayo-True_Cost_of_Poor_Health.pdf (“[M]any 
organizations currently don’t pay enough attention to the hidden costs of avoidable sick days and 
presenteeism – the cost of employees who are on the job but not fully functioning because of real illnesses 
and medical conditions, including asthma, seasonal allergies, arthritis, migraines, depression, back pain, 
gastrointestinal disorders and diabetes. . . . Depression costs U.S. employers more than $35 billion a year 
in reduced performance at work. On-the-job pain (including back pain, headaches and arthritis) costs 
employers nearly $47 billion a year in productivity loss. In one study, chronic conditions alone were 
estimated to cost The Dow Chemical Company more than $100 million annually in lost productivity for 
its U.S. work force – the equivalent of 6.8 percent of total lab costs for the company in 2002. One research 
team calculated the total cost of presenteeism in the United States to be greater than $150 billion per year.”); 
see also Bruce Japsen, U.S. Workforce Illness Costs $576B Annually from Sick Days to Workers 
Compensation, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2012/09/12/u-s-
workforce-illness-costs-576b-annually-from-sick-days-to-workers-compensation (“The Integrated 
Benefits Institute, which represents major U.S. employers and business coalitions, says poor health costs 
the U.S. economy $576 billion a year, according to new research. Of that amount, 39 percent, or $227 
billion is from ‘lost productivity’ from employee absenteeism due to illness or what researchers called 
‘presenteeism,’ when employees report to work but illness keeps them from performing at their best.”). 
While not all the productivity loss can be attributed to poor or 
unaffordable housing, much of it can.39 Thus, the provision of decent affordable 
housing would likely correct some of the productivity loss due to both absenteeism 
and presenteeism. 
B. Explaining the Housing Deficit 
I have previously offered several possible explanations for the deficit of decent 
affordable housing units. The possibilities range from the obvious to the obscure. 
                                                                                                                         
35. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 1003–4. 
36. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.c. 
37. See id. 
38. 
39. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 8. 
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1. Misaligned Incentives 
Among the obvious reasons for the deficit is that there is very little incentive 
for developers to produce affordable housing.40 The profit potential for market-rate 
housing is far greater than for housing that is affordable to people below eighty 
percent of the area median income (AMI). By definition, low-income households 
have difficulty paying market rates in many of the nation’s communities. Without 
government (or other) subsidies, developers and landlords would take on 
significant economic risk (not to mention opportunity costs) by providing 
affordable housing. However, if there are significant societal savings and benefits 
to be had through the provision of decent affordable housing, one might think the 
market ought to provide it. 
2. Legal Barriers to Development 
There are several legal barriers to the development of affordable housing that 
either make such housing impossible to build or increase to unmanageable levels 
the costs of building. Density, lot size, setback, and height restrictions are among 
the barriers that fit this model. There are also environmental regulations, impact 
fees, and permitting issues that increase costs and/or create delays in developing 
the property.41 Several commentators have noted the effect that regulatory issues 
have on the supply of affordable housing and on housing prices.42 
See Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20536, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20536.pdf (“[R]egulation 
appears to be the single most important influence on the supply of homes.”); see also Michael H. Schill, 
Regulation and Housing Development: What We Know, 8 CITYSCAPE 5, 8 (2005) (“[S]ome regulations 
may generate a surplus of benefits over costs, but the benefits will primarily inure to higher income families 
and the costs to low- and moderate-income families.”). 
3. Political Barriers 
There is a connection between the legal barriers to the creation of affordable 
housing and the political ones.43 The latter fall into two broad categories: private 
resistance, often manifested through NIMBYism (the Not in my Backyard 
phenomenon); and public choice issues. NIMBYism is generally recognized as 
groups opposed to a particular development organizing and, through political 
action (legal or extra-legal in nature), making public their opposition to that 
development. That action might also take the form of demonstrations, lobbying, or 
finding or promoting candidates for public office who support the group’s 
immediate or long-term view concerning development in their neighborhood.  
40. Michael Diamond & J. Peter Byrne, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The 
Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 530 (2007). 
41. Id.; see also Diamond, supra note 2, at 989. 
42. 
The public choice theory, on the other hand, applies classical rational person 
economic analysis to decision-making by public officials. The theory posits that 
such officials place a high value on remaining in office and therefore make 
43. Diamond
                                                                                                                         
, supra note 2, at 991. 
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decisions calculated to achieve that result even if that decision conflicts with what 
they might prefer in their private capacity.44 This leads them to vote as desired by 
contributors and those who are active and influential politically. That normally 
does not include low-income individuals and their advocates. 
III. THE MAGNITUDE OF PUBLIC BENEFIT FROM  
PROVIDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
There are estimates that the housing deficit for extremely low-income 
households in United States approaches eight million units.45 The cost to develop 
anything approaching that number of units could be well over one trillion dollars.46 
Olivia Barrow, New Report Finds Reasonable Development Costs in Housing Credit Units 
Nationwide, ENTERPRISE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/2018/09/new-report-
finds-reasonable-development-costs-in-housing-credit-units.  
In addition, the ongoing operations of those units would need to be subsidized. 
Today, the federal government spends approximately fifty billion dollars 
annually 47  on affordable housing and, of course, it would have to spend 
considerably more than that if significant numbers of new affordable units came 
online. 
In order to determine whether the massive costs of producing and subsidizing 
such housing would be economically beneficial, one might, as government 
agencies must do prior to promulgating significant new regulations, perform a 
CBA.48  While there is a robust academic and political debate concerning the 
appropriateness of performing a CBA in the face of human need, there are at least 
two strains of literature that attempt to address this issue.49 
 
The first looks at the 
problem of unquantifiable costs or benefits in the context of a CBA. The second 
addresses the rate of return on “social investment.” 
                                                               
44. James Buchanan, one of the progenitors of public choice theory, has said:  
Public choice theory has been the avenue through which a romantic and illusory set 
of notions about the workings of governments and the behavior of persons who 
govern has been replaced by a set of notions that embody more skepticism about what 
governments can do and what governors will do, notions that are surely more 
consistent with the political reality that we may all observe about us. 
James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its 
Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II, at 11, 13 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 
1984). 
45. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. 
46. 
                                                          
While there is a body of costs and benefits that are large, observable, 
quantifiable, and monetizable, other benefits are much harder to quantify or to 
monetize. These include personhood benefits, such as self-esteem and a sense of 
well-being, the value of which are supposed to be included when preparing a CBA. 
47 . CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-50782, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2015) (“In 2014, the federal government provided about $50 billion in housing assistance 
specifically designated for low income households. . . . Since that time, such assistance has remained 
relatively stable at about $50 billion annually.”). 
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (amending and consolidating 
several Reagan-era orders). 
49. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
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Through the remainder of this Part, I will discuss the problem of benefits that are 
hard to quantify or monetize. I will also catalog a magnitude of benefits to be 
derived from providing and subsidizing a sufficient number of affordable housing 
units. 
Each social cost I discuss strongly correlates with inadequate or unaffordable 
housing. Yet there are factors other than housing that also correlate with the 
negative outcomes presented. Many of these other factors, such as poverty, lack of 
employment skills, and health, have a significant interaction with housing, making 
causality between any of these factors and the outcome difficult to establish.50 
Thus, the problematic issues of quantification and monetization. 
In this Section, I will discuss two theories, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and 
Social Return on Investment (SROI), that purport to aid in efforts to quantify and 
monetize the costs and benefits of any action or decision. Each theory purports to 
do a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits of government providing for 
additional decent, affordable housing units. While I believe the two theories have 
significant flaws, I have adopted their use here because they have achieved favor 
with a segment of the economics and political establishment. I will offer a critique 
of these theories, particularly CBAs, but will utilize them to show that affordable 
housing would meet their economic requirements. My goal is to show that even 
using devices favored by economists and politicians, the production of 
significantly more affordable housing is warranted. 
A. Quantifying the Unquantifiable, Monetization,  
and Social Return on Investment 
The federal government has never provided the support necessary to close the 
gap between the number of decent and affordable housing units needed and the 
number of such units that exist. There are many theories as to why that support has 
been lacking, the most benign of which is that the realities of the economy and of 
government resources do not justify or permit the investment. While I do not in 
this Article address the wide array of theories that have been put forward on this 
point, I do wish to concentrate on a particular one—the economic and government 
resource argument. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Ever since the first Executive Order, in 1981, 51  
                                                               
50. One’s lack of means can lead not only to poor housing but also to poor health, poor educational 
opportunities, and a contraction of life experiences, including employment opportunities and performance. 
Moreover, health impacts educational achievement and vice versa. Both impact job possibilities which in 
turn impact health and education. I have chosen housing as the focal point of this analysis because it is 
physically central to everyday existence and is most responsive immediately to direct intervention.  
51. Exec. Order No. 12,991, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). 
                                                          
requiring that CBAs be 
undertaken prior to major regulations, agencies and scholars have been aware of 
the problem of uncertainty in quantifying and monetizing costs and, particularly, 
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benefits. 52  In fact, the Orders specifically empower the agencies to consider 
benefits that cannot be quantified such as dignity, fairness, and distributional 
affects. 53  This Article does not deal with issues related to the adoption of 
regulations. It deals instead with problems of adopting policy and, perhaps, 
legislation. But, as Cass Sunstein, a strong advocate for CBA, stated in an article 
dealing with the problem of difficult-to-quantify costs and benefits: “. . . it should 
be clear [throughout this article] that the implications are far broader [than simply 
regulatory policy]. In many areas of law and policy, it is important and perhaps 
even necessary to catalog both costs and benefits and to explore whether the 
benefits justify the costs.”54 
With this idea in mind, I want to adapt for the purpose of this discussion the 
same type of required Cost-Benefit Analysis for major regulatory proposals to the 
broader realm of government policy and budgetary action in relation to affordable 
housing.55 In doing so, however, I will refer to and discuss some of the critiques of 
CBAs, particularly those concerning the problems of uncertainty and 
incommensurability. 
Many commentators have addressed the problem of uncertainty in both the 
quantification and monetization of costs and benefits.56 Sunstein recognizes that 
agencies are often presented with difficult-to-quantify-or-monetize costs or 
benefits. He points out that, often, they do not engage in such quantification. In 
this regard, Sunstein notes three types of problems associated with an agency’s 
effort to quantify or monetize any particular cost or benefit. The first, he says, is 
“epistemic,” a lack of knowledge about how to quantify and monetize the cost or 
benefit.57 The second involves a quarrel with “standard economic thinking about 
monetization”—that the numbers derived from an analysis would not be an 
“appropriate basis for policy.”58 The third relates to incommensurability; that is, 
that one attribute—human dignity, for example—cannot be made the equivalent 
of a sum of money.59 
52. 
                                                                                                                         
The most recent Executive Orders are Exec. Order No. 13,771, 89 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) 
and Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
53. 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821 (“Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and 
discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 
fairness, and distributive impacts.”). 
54. Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2014). 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 340 
(2006) (“Quantitative risk assessment has proven quite daunting, because data gaps make estimating the 
number of illnesses, deaths, and ecological disturbances a particular regulation will avoid impossible for 
most health effects and nearly all ecological effects. When agencies can estimate the magnitude of some 
health effects, that estimation usually requires a lot of guesswork in order to extrapolate estimates of a 
discrete regulation’s impact on human health from data that often comes from laboratory tests on other 
species or from human experience with much larger doses than those that the rules under consideration 
address.”). 
57. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 1375. 
58. Id. at 1375–76. 
59. Id. at 1376. 
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Sunstein goes on to propose several ways for an agency to address these 
problems, all of which he compiles under a heading of “breakeven analysis.”60 To 
summarize, Sunstein wants agencies to narrow, as much as possible, the space 
between the quantifiable and monetizable costs and the quantifiable and 
monetizable benefits.61 Then, concerning the resulting gap, he asks, “[h]ow high 
would the benefits have to be in order for the costs to be justified?”62 
Masur and Posner also recognize the uncertainties inherent in the conduct of 
CBAs by agencies.63 They studied “all the major regulations issued by agencies 
from 2010 to 2013” and found “countless examples . . . where agencies fail to fully 
monetize the benefits and costs of regulations” even though, in most cases, they 
could have done so.64 Since CBAs are intended as a “decision procedure that 
requires the decision-maker to estimate both the benefits and the costs of a 
regulation in monetary terms” they point out that when “a regulator chooses not to 
monetize all the benefits or all the costs, it is not doing a cost-benefit analysis.”65 
They then ask, “[i]f it is not doing cost-benefit analysis, what is it doing?”66 
They recognize two distinct problems in conducting a CBA. The first is one of 
causation: whether there is “empirical uncertainty as to whether the regulation will 
have the intended behavioral effects.” 67  The second problem involves 
monetization: “certain benefits are hard to monetize because no market exists in 
those benefits.”68 Taking on the monetization problem, Masur and Posner propose 
a method for agencies to engage in Cost-Benefit Analysis when they don’t have a 
“reliable basis” for making a valuation.69 That method involves regulators making 
(20“reasonable guesses about the harms or benefits of regulations.” 70  These 
                                                               
60. Id. at 1385. Sunstein reprises the phrase “breakeven analysis” from OMB Circular A-4, which 
provides authoritative guidance on regulatory impact analysis, and states: 
It will not always be possible to express in monetary units all of the important benefits 
and costs. When it is not, the most efficient alternative will not necessarily be the one 
with the largest quantified and monetized net-benefit estimate. In such cases, you 
should exercise professional judgment in determining how important the 
nonquantified benefits or costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. If the 
nonquantified benefits and costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a 
“threshold” analysis to evaluate their significance. Threshold or “break-even” 
analysis answers the question, “How small could the value of the nonquantified 
benefits be (or how large would the value of the nonquantified costs need to be) before 
the rule would yield zero net benefits?” In addition to threshold analysis you should 
indicate, where possible, which nonquantified effects are most important and why. 
Id. (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND 
ESTABLISHMENTS REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003)) 
61. Id. at 1385–89. 
62. Id. at 1387. 
63. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under 
Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016). 
64. Id. at 92. 
65. Id. at 89.  
66. Id. 
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guesses would be based “on the experience and latent knowledge of the agency 
staff.”71 
In elaborating on this proposal, Masur and Posner describe an Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)72 
OSHA is an agency of the U.S. government within the U.S. Department of Labor that is charged 
with ensuring the health and safety of workers while on the job. See About OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
staff member who has worked at the 
agency for decades and has developed an “intuitive sense of when chemical 
substances are dangerous and when they are not.”73 While the staff member may 
not be certain of her intuition, she believes it is correct. Masur and Posner call this 
a Bayesian “prior,” which they characterize as more than a “random guess” and as 
providing “useful information.”74 
They develop this idea by pointing out that there is a distinction between CBAs 
as a procedure and CBAs as a set of inputs.75 Procedurally, CBAs direct agencies 
to “issue regulations if the benefits exceed the costs.”76 As a set of inputs, CBAs 
are silent concerning the types of informational inputs the agency should use. 
Masur and Posner state that: 
Regulators should use all relevant informational inputs when they 
conduct cost-benefit analyses . . . This means that the regulator’s 
prior should be used rather than disregarded. The process of 
repeatedly updating the prior in light of new information has a 
dynamic or Bayesian quality that distinguishes it from cost-benefit 
analysis as traditionally understood.77 
Of course, the agency must articulate and justify its prior so there can be 
critical evaluation of it.78 The agency should quantify all the benefits it perceives 
in light of its articulated prior, even benefits thought difficult to quantify and 
monetize. 
Amy Sinden reiterates the point that many CBAs fail to quantify or monetize 
important benefits stemming from regulation.79 She analyzed forty-five CBAs 
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and found that in thirty-
six of them the “EPA described as ‘significant,’ or ‘substantial’ categories of 
benefits that the agency excluded as unquantifiable due to data limitations. Indeed, 
in certain instances, the monetized benefits estimate left out the value of 
ameliorating the very harm at which the rule itself was aimed.”80 Such a failure 
raises significant questions about the value of CBAs. In short, to reprise Masur and 
Posner’s query, “[i]f it is not doing cost-benefit analysis, what is it doing?”81 
71. 
                                                                                                                         
Id.  
72. 
73. Masur & Posner, supra note 63, at 119. 
74. Id. at 119–20. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 121. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 125. 
79. Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits, 49 ENVTL. L. 73 (2019). 
80. Id. at 79–80. 
81. See Masur & Posner, supra note 62, at 89. 
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2. Social Return on Investment 
In a similar vein, but with a very different focus, is the concept of Social Return 
on Investment (SROI).82 
The concept of SROI was first developed in the late 1990s by the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund 
(REDF). SROI “measures enterprises’ social benefits to society through outcomes.” Measurement and Evaluation, 
REDF, https://redf.org/the-impact/measurement-evaluation (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). Since then, there has been a 
significant body of literature about SROI. See also, e.g., Dr. Malin Arvidson et al., The Ambitions and Challenges of 
SROI 4 (Third Sector Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 49, 2010), http://bigpushforward.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/the_ambitions_and_challenges_of_sroi.pdf; Patrick W. Ryan & Issac Lyne, Social 
Enterprise and the Measurement of Social Value: Methodological Issues with the Calculation and Application of the 
Social Return on Investment, 2 EDUC., KNOWLEDGE & ECON. 223 (2008). 
SROI purports to “measure the level of social value 
created by the activities of social enterprise.”83 For this purpose, social investment 
is a capacious concept including investment for social good by the non-profit, 
public, benefit corporation, and even mission-driven for-profit sectors of the 
economy. There are more narrow definitions of social investment; Ryan and Lyne, 
for example, have defined a social enterprise as one which engages in business 
“with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for 
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the 
need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.” 84  For our purposes, 
however, the scope of the definition is relatively unimportant.  
SROI analysis is very similar to CBA with a few major differences. The main 
one is that SROI is often applied to entities that do not have a profit motive or, in 
some instances, have a mixed profit and social motive. Entities such as 
government, non-profits, and, to a lesser extent, benefit corporations seek social 
gains as their goal, or, at least, as a significant goal of the enterprise. Thus, 
according to one group of commentators SROI is “‘a form of adjusted cost-benefit 
analysis that takes into account, in a more holistic way, the various types of impact’ 
that programs have . . . . From a technical point of view, we argue there is not much 
difference between classical cost-benefit analysis . . . and SROI.”85 
As such, SROI faces the same challenges in valuing intangible benefits as the 
CBA model. It is difficult to capture in monetary terms the increase in a 
beneficiary’s feeling of well-being or, as Arvidson et al. state, in the “improvement 
of personal utility (i.e. quality of life).”86 Arvidson et al. also  point out other 
problems with SROI analysis, such as causality and displacement issues. 87 
Nevertheless, they note, much as I have, that “proponents suggest it is important 
to quantify [intangible values] despite these limitations as an economic value is 
able to have more influence over policy and commercial interests.”88 
8
                                                                                                                         
2. 
Other bases that have been presented for pursuing additional affordable 
housing have failed to produce that housing. Perhaps an economic argument will 
get greater attention. 
83. Ryan & Lyne, supra note 82, at 223. 
84. Id. at 224. 
85. Arvidson et al., supra note 82, at 4. 
86. Id. at 11. 
87. Id. at 13. Displacement refers to the beneficiary of a social investment benefiting at the expense 
of someone else who would have obtained the benefit and now does not. 
88. Id. at 12. 
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B. Observable and Not-So-Observable Benefits of Decent Affordable Housing 
For about forty years, there has been a federal requirement that, prior to 
proposing a “major” rule, all federal executive agencies (other than independent 
agencies), must prepare a CBA.89 The analysis must lay out the costs and benefits 
of the proposed regulation and provide a justification for the regulatory scheme 
proposed. 90  In some cases, the costs and benefits are easily identifiable, 
quantifiable, and monetizable—that is, converted into a dollar equivalent. In 
others, the costs and, more typically, the benefits, either cannot be measured, or 
the measurable elements cannot be converted to monetary terms.91 I propose in this 
section to apply Cost-Benefit Analysis to the provision of affordable housing. 
As I pointed out earlier, many costs to society can be attributed to the lack of 
decent affordable housing. Strong correlations have been found between poor or 
unaffordable housing and specific outcomes for low-income residents in areas such 
as health, education, criminal justice, employment, and productivity. Many of 
these costs could be avoided through the provision of decent affordable housing, 
although it is not clear exactly how much of the costs could thus be avoided. There 
are other costs, in areas such as human dignity and concepts of justice and equality, 
that also could be avoided by the provision of such housing. The avoidance of these 
costs are benefits to society and ought to be accounted for in any CBA. There are, 
however, problems in quantifying and monetizing some of these costs and 
problems in identifying causality between the absence of housing and the 
associated costs.  
1. Hard to Measure Benefits 
In this section I will point out some of the less readily visible, quantifiable, or 
monetizable benefits to society of providing affordable housing. Where possible, I 
will attempt to indicate an order of magnitude for the costs avoided or the benefits 
obtained. 
a. Homelessness 
The area with the most solid causal connections involves homelessness. Not 
only is the connection between an inadequate supply of affordable housing and 
homelessness readily apparent, but we can also quantify and monetize most of the 
harms associated with homelessness. These involve direct out-of-pocket costs to 
society and indirect costs such as educational deficits, employment and 
productivity losses, and damage to the lives of homeless people.92 
Programs such as Housing First 93  focus on getting homeless people into 
permanent housing without prerequisites such as sobriety, counseling, or securing 
                                                                                                                         
89. Exec. Order No. 12,991, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).  
90. Id. 
91. See generally Sunstein, supra note 54; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 63. 
92. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 996–1012. 
93. See Housing First, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, 
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https://endhomelessness.org/resource/housing-first (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
employment. They have proven quite successful in keeping formerly homeless 
individuals and families housed as well as in the reduction of their use of expensive 
social services.94 The cost savings associated with this lower level of use have been 
substantial.95 There has not been, however, a calculation of the value of an increase 
in dignity, self-esteem, or engagement with society to the formerly homeless 
individual or families. Similarly, there has not been a clear measurement of the 
benefits to local communities from greater access to public space due to the lower 
levels of homeless encampments, panhandling, or petty crime. Moreover, there has 
been little measurement of the possible increase in business activity in or the 
improved appearance and usage of downtown shopping districts that might result 
from housing large numbers of formerly homeless people who congregated in such 
districts. 
As I mentioned, the causal connection between providing housing to the 
homeless and societal cost savings and benefits is clear, but it is not absolute. 
Among the imperfections in the causal claim is that not all homeless people will 
benefit from a Housing First (or similar) approach. Some will remain homeless, 
others will return to homelessness, and many will continue to utilize costly public 
services or have a negative impact on local communities. Nevertheless, significant 
direct cost savings can be observed (or can be projected based on more stable 
health and education) while other cost savings can be strongly intuited. Surely, for 
example, the gains in human dignity, self-esteem, and society’s sense of equality 
and social justice will exist despite being hard to quantify or to monetize. 
b. General Health 
Similar difficulties are present concerning the effects of poor or unaffordable 
housing on the general health of residents. The overall governmental cost of health 
care in the United States is more than one trillion dollars per year.96 
Sara Kliff, Health-Care Spending, VOX (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/4/30/18077016/health-care-spending.  
Additional 
cost is attributed to charitable organizations and to hospitals which provide 
emergency care, often without reimbursement.97 
See, e.g., Maureen Groppe, Who Pays When Someone Without Insurance Shows Up in the ER?, 
USA TODAY (July 3, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/03/who-pays-when-
someone-without-insurance-shows-up-er/445756001; Drew Calvert, Who Bears the Cost of the 
Uninsured? Nonprofit Hospitals, KELLOGGINSIGHT (June 22, 2015), 
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/who-bears-the-cost-of-the-uninsured-nonprofit-hospitals.  
While not all public health care 
                                                                                                                         
94. See, e.g., Angela Ly & Eric Latimer, Housing First Impact on Costs and Associated Cost Offsets: 
A Review of the Literature, 60 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 475, 475–76, 482, 485–86 (2015) (“While our review 
casts doubt on whether [Housing First] programs can be expected to pay for themselves, the certainty of 
significant cost offsets, combined with their benefits for participants, means that they represent a more 
efficient allocation of resources than traditional services.”); see also Mary E. Larimer et al., Health Care 
and Public Service Use and Costs Before and After Provision of Housing for Chronically Homeless 
Persons with Severe Alcohol Problems, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1349, 1349 (2009) (“The provision of 
housing reduces hospital visits, admissions, and duration of hospital stays among homeless individuals, 
and overall public system spending is reduced by nearly as much as is spent on housing.”). 
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spending is attributable to housing problems, a significant portion of it is. 
According to researchers, “[a]s of January 2017, an estimated 553,742 people in 
the United States experience homelessness on a given night and in 2016, 30 million 
households in the United States reported having significant physical or health 
hazards within their homes.”98 
Stephanie Diaz, The Effects of Housing Insecurity on Health Outcomes and Costs, HEALTHIFY 
BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.healthify.us/healthify-insights/the-effects-of-housing-
instability-on-health-outcomes-and-costs. Diaz goes on to report that almost thirty-three percent of 
emergency room visits are made by the homeless and that each visit costs up to $3,700. Id. 
Concerning the importance of housing to health, 
one commentator has argued: “housing is a critical vaccine that can pave the way 
to long-term health and well-being.”99  
Megan T. Sandel, Housing Is a Critical Vaccine, ENTERPRISE (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/2016/02/housing-critical-vaccine.  
Consider the problems that may attend to those in inadequate units or cost 
burdened households. There may be insufficient funds for preventative care or for 
proper nutrition.100 Similarly, children exposed to environmental hazards such as 
lead paint, mold, or allergens often exhibit developmental difficulties and chronic 
conditions that may plague them throughout their lives.101 Each of these issues can 
lead to educational deficits, which often presage employment and productivity 
deficits. 
In addition to problems with the housing itself, the effects of housing 
insecurity, which describes the psychological effects on an individual of the loss 
of, or perceived threat of losing, his or her home add a significant cost. This 
situation has been referred to as “pre-homelessness.”102  
See BROOKE SPELLMAN ET AL., COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRST-TIME HOMELESSNESS FOR 
FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS A-14 (2010), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pdf/Costs_Homeless.pdf.  
The costs of housing 
insecurity may be the least visible of the health issues attributed to the lack of 
affordable housing and often involves a housing insecure resident making several 
moves within a short period of time. 
The effects of housing insecurity manifest themselves in a variety of ways 
including high levels of stress and hyper-tension, 103  lack of stable access to 
continuous health and social service, 104  and loss of social networks and the 
corresponding social safety net.105 Concerning the effect on children, Maqbool et 
al. found 
Children without stable housing were more likely to use 
emergency department services as a result of a lack of a regular 
health care provider. Children under three years who had moved 
two or more times in the previous year were found to have lower 
weight for their age . . . and they were at greater risk of 
developmental problems. Among adolescents, a significant 
                                                                                                                         
98. 
99. 
100. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.  
101. Id. at 5. 
102. 
103. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 3–4. 
104. Id. at 5. 
105. Id. at 6. 
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association was found between early use of illicit drugs and 
moving four or more times before the age of sixteen years.106 
Some of the costs of these problems will be captured in the healthcare costs or 
in the losses attributed to employment or productivity deficits. Others will not and 
those losses are very difficult to quantify or monetize.  
c. Education 
As we have seen, there is a good deal of writing about the relationship between 
housing and education.107 
See MAYA BRENNAN ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON EDUCATION: A 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 7 (2014), https://www.nhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/The-Impacts-of-
Affordable-Housing-on-Education-1.pdf; Rebekah Coley et al., Relations Between Housing 
Characteristics and the Well-Being of Low-Income Children and Adolescents, 49 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1775, 
1776, 1785 (2013). I have also written on this issue, see Diamond, supra note 2, at 1003. 
There is also robust literature concerning the cost to 
society of educational deficits and the benefits to be derived by society for 
students’ achieving a higher educational level.108 
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL & EMRE ERKUT, THE BENEFITS TO TAXPAYERS FROM INCREASES IN 
STUDENTS’ EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (2009), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG686.pdf; see also HENRY LEVIN ET 
AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN (2007), 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8CF9QG9; BYRON G. AUGUSTE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC 
COST OF THE US EDUCATION GAP (2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/the-
economic-cost-of-the-us-education-gap.  
For example, Carroll and Erkut 
point out the “benefits to taxpayers from increases in students’ educational 
attainment are very high” and “those benefits are entirely separate from the 
benefits that the students themselves gain through increased education.”109 
Some of the benefits are easily recognizable and quantifiable. For example, 
increasing one’s education is likely to increase one’s earning capacity. Carroll and 
Erkut suggest that for each additional year of schooling one might expect on 
average a seven to ten percent increase in earnings.110 What is less immediately 
apparent is the benefit to the public through the increase in federal, state, and local 
taxes (including sales and property taxes) along with increased payments to Social 
Security and to Medicare. 
While Carroll and Erkut point out there are demographic differences in the 
amount of increased expected income based on race and gender, they project a 
discounted present value (in 2002 dollars) of a lifetime increase in tax payments 
made by high school dropouts and by college graduates to be between $128,000 
and $192,000.111 Levin et al. made a similar calculation, but theirs is based on a 
lifetime earnings and tax differential, without reducing them to a present value 
figure.112 
106. 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 3. 
107. 
Again, they point out demographic and gender differences, with the 
lifetime increased earnings ranging from approximately $250,000 for white female 
108. 
109. CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 108, at iii. 
110. Id. at 15; see also LEVIN ET AL., supra note 108, at 7.  
111. CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 108, at 37–38. 
112. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 108, at 7. 
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dropouts to approximately $2,000,000 for white male college graduates. 113 
Similarly, the increased lifetime tax payments range from approximately $80,000 
for white female dropouts to approximately $900,000 for white male college 
graduates.114 
There are several other public cost savings that highly correlate with increased 
education. Since more highly educated people typically earn higher incomes, there 
is a reduced call for publicly supported social program funds. These include such 
items as public assistance and Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, 
housing subsidies, and Medicaid. 115  Increased educational attainment is also 
correlated with decreased criminal activity. This is due to the lower need for 
criminal activity to support oneself as well as the higher opportunity costs for 
committing crimes. This should result in a downward movement of expenditures 
for police, courts, prisons and jails, as well as for the total costs of incarceration.116 
Again, these assessments deal only with the reduction in public expenditures 
and do not count the private benefit of individuals feeling safer due to the reduction 
in crime or the self-esteem benefits to the employed person who need not resort to 
crime. There will, however, also be secondary benefits to society. For example, the 
higher incomes earned by those who increase their educational attainment will 
result in a multiplier effect.117 
Akhilesh Ganti, Multiplier Effect, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multipliereffect.asp (explaining the definition of “multiplier effect”). 
Some of the additional income will be spent to 
purchase goods and services. As these will be new inputs into the economy, these 
expenditures will provide new income to the vendors of those goods and services, 
who will, in turn, spend some of their increased income on additional employees, 
goods and services, and so on. Furthermore, the higher educational attainment of 
individuals will lead to more productivity for their employers and the same 
multiplier effect should apply. These are benefits that, despite the difficulty of 
quantifying and monetizing, need to be included in a more comprehensive CBA.  
d. Productivity 
I have discussed earlier the relationship between poor quality or unaffordable 
housing and health.118 When that relationship is superimposed onto the workplace, 
the effects are absenteeism, presenteeism, and other reductions in productivity. 
Presenteeism has been defined as “being present at work but unable to be fully 
engaged in the work environment. This condition leads to measurable loss of 
productivity due to physical, mental, and emotional health conditions or related to 
work, personal, social, and emotional life issues.”119 Presenteeism has an impact 
113. 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 8. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. at 12 (estimating the present value of lifetime public health care savings by high school 
graduates over dropouts to average $40,000); see also id. at 15 (estimating the savings of education on 
other welfare programs); CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 107, at 19, 41–60. 
116. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 107, at 13; see also CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 107, at 21. 
117. 
118. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
119. Diane M. Lack, Presenteeism Revisited: A Comprehensive Review, 59 WORKPLACE HEALTH & 
SAFETY J. 77, 77 (2011). 
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on “individuals and organizations—including effects on quality of life and health, 
increased health care costs, adverse effects for coworkers, increased occupational 
accidents related to distractibility, and deterioration of service and product 
quality.”120 
One group of commentators state that for the set of chronic conditions studied, 
“the costs associated with performance based work loss or ‘presenteeism’ greatly 
exceeded the combined costs of absenteeism and medical treatment combined.”121 
They found the average annual health related costs at the major U.S. employer they 
studied were, in 2002 dollars, $2,278 for medical care, $661 due to absenteeism, 
and $6,721 due to presenteeism. 122  Lack has stated that the annual cost of 
presenteeism to the economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was 180 
billion dollars.123 
C. A Short Critique of CBAs 
There is a body of literature that is critical of the CBA approach for reasons 
other than the technical one of not being able to quantify or monetize certain kinds 
of social benefits.124 These critiques include objections to the position of most 
CBA advocates that CBA provides an “objective”125 or “neutral”126 analysis to 
reach efficient outcomes. One such critic, Lisa Heinzerling, wrote a reply to Cass 
Sunstein’s argument in favor of “breakeven analysis.”127 In it, Heinzerling takes 
on Sunstein’s claim that breakeven analysis softens the harshness of a traditional 
CBA, but her critique goes beyond breakeven analysis to implicate problems with 
CBAs themselves. She states: 
If breakeven analysis were, as Professor Sunstein suggests, a way 
“to avoid the risks that judgments will be based on anecdotes, 
intuitions, dogmas, impressions, or the power of self-interested 
private groups,” one would predict that agencies would deploy it 
across a full range of rules with costs or benefits that are difficult 
to quantify or monetize. If agencies do not do this, then one must 
120. 
                                                                                                                         
Id. 
121. James J. Collins et al., The Assessment of Chronic Health Conditions on Work Performance, 
Absence, and Total Economic Impact for Employers, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 547, 557 
(2005). 
122. Id. at 554. 
123. Lack, supra note 119, at 80. 
124. For an interesting breakdown of arguments both in favor of and opposed to Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, see Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998). 
125. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 59–61 
(2012) (“In reality, CBA inevitably requires value judgments that are inherently subjective, rendering the 
analyses potentially manipulable for political ends.”). 
126. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 56, at 1; see also Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1981) (arguing “there is no ‘neutral’ or 
‘correct’ way to solve this problem [the value of impacts on people], that the liberal procedure with respect 
to it has been inconsistent, and the recognition of value judgments involved in selecting a solution would 
deprive the efficiency calculus of some of its bogus air of objectivity”). 
127. Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 
1458 (2014). 
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ask whether breakeven analysis is being selectively deployed to 
rescue only those rules that are already deemed worthy on some 
basis other than cost-benefit analysis. If there is such deployment 
of breakeven analysis, then it is possible that the use of breakeven 
analysis itself may reflect “anecdotes, intuitions, dogmas, 
impressions, or the power of self-interested private groups.” That 
would be a problem for Professor Sunstein’s account of the utility 
of breakeven analysis.128 
The fact is, Cost-Benefit Analysis is just one of many ways that one might 
evaluate the efficacy of a proposal. Its proponents laud its objectivity, but fail to 
account for the normative choice that underlies it: that economic efficiency is the 
value that should be privileged rather than human life, environmental protection, 
or any number of other competing values.129 As such, CBA is based on a series of 
subjective, often highly politicized, starting stimuli and carries no more value than 
any other subjectively based analysis. 
Closely related to this problem is the problem of CBAs attempting to 
commodify non-market based social benefits. In relation to government programs, 
Ackerman and Heinzerling have pointed out that: 
Cost-benefit analysis tries to mimic a basic function of markets by 
setting an economic standard for measuring the success of a 
government’s projects and programs. That is, cost-benefit analysis 
seeks to perform, for public policy, a calculation that happens 
routinely in the private sector. In evaluating a proposed new 
initiative, how do we know if it is worth doing? The answer is 
much simpler in business than in government.130 
The problem they identify leads to two significant concerns. The first is 
economic. Assuming that the intangible benefits of a program can be valued, how 
is that value determined? The second is moral. Is it appropriate to set a price on 
environmental preservation, the extinction of a species, or on human life or health? 
In the next sections, I will briefly address both questions. 
1. The economic critique 
In this section, I re-examine the monetization of difficult-to-monetize benefits. 
Here the critique will concern not the ability to monetize, but the method of 
monetization. I first want to address what Duncan Kennedy has called the “offer-
asking problem.”131 I will then discuss the discount rate applied to benefits to be 
derived in the future in order to determine their present value. 
                                                               
128. Id. at 1459.  
129. Cole, supra note 125, at 59. 
130. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1556 (2002). 
131. Kennedy, supra note 126 at 401. 
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a. The “offer-asking problem” 
When there is a difficult-to-monetize problem, economists often solve it by 
asking two related questions. First, they might ask individuals what they would 
pay to obtain a particular benefit. Second, and alternatively, they might ask 
individuals what they would accept in order to give up the same entitlement. As 
Kennedy points out, the endowment effect often leads to the same person 
answering the two questions very differently.132 
A valuation based on such questions is also suspect because of the wealth 
effect. If a certain desirable benefit is not mandatorily available for the entire 
population, creating values for it based on what a person would pay to obtain it 
clearly favors those with greater resources. Kennedy proposes an example of the 
competition to obtain the use of a dialysis machine.133 The wealthy can offer 
greater amounts for its use compared to the poor. Therefore, the allocation of such 
machines for the use of the wealthy would be efficient but would authorize the 
distributers of the machine “to disregard the actual suffering of many poor patients 
in favor of the actual money of a few rich ones.”134 This concern will be revisited 
in the next section on the moral critique. 
Ackerman and Heinzerling use a different example to illustrate a similar point. 
They discuss the problem of lead poisoning, which can cause serious 
developmental damage in children.135 They cite an economist’s study extrapolating 
from what parents pay for a supposed treatment for lead poisoning to a dollar 
valuation for each IQ point loss. The study concluded that the then current 
standards that sought to protect children from lead hazards “may make little sense” 
and that “agencies should consider relaxing their lead standards.”136 Because low-
income families typically deal with the problem of lead contamination and since 
those families have limited resources to ameliorate the problem or treat its effects, 
using their expenditures to value the benefit of being free from the consequences 
of lead paint is unreliable. What they would pay if they had greater resources is 
left unexplored and, presumably, deemed irrelevant. It should be clear, however, 
that the pre-existing distribution of resources has a great effect on how value is 
determined. To quote Kennedy, “[i]t allows the liberal analyst to factor into the 
efficiency calculus disutilities of people who quite clearly have neither the property 
right nor the income to give those disutilities a ‘social’ weight.”137 
                                                               
132. Id.  
133. Id. at 407. 
134. Id. 
135. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1554 (explaining “[o]ne of the most serious and 
disturbing effects of lead contamination is the neurological damage it can cause in young children, 
including permanently diminished mental ability. Putting a dollar value on the (avoidable, environmentally 
caused) retardation of children is a daunting task but the economic analysts have not been deterred”).  
136. Id. at 1555. The authors offer another example concerning the practices of mothers’ car seat 
fastening practices. The study examined the time difference between correctly fastening car seats and 
mothers’ actual practices. They valued the time difference by using the mothers’ actual or imputed wage 
rate, thus valuing the mothers’ valuation of the risks to their children by incorrectly fastening the seats. Id. 
at 1555–56. 
137. Kennedy, supra note 126, at 407. 
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b. Discounting future benefits 
For many social benefits, the political sequencing involves considering the 
making of a current investment with the goal of reaping benefits in the future. One 
can understand environmental regulation, for example, as a currently pertinent 
instance of this approach. When benefits (or costs, for that matter) are to be derived 
in the future, the monetary value of those benefits must be discounted to bring 
them into line with current costs; they must be reduced to present value. One must 
identify a time horizon for realizing expected benefits and then monetize them, 
before determining how much would one have to invest today in order to receive 
the benefit in the future. The discount rate is an interest rate that is used to 
determine how much must be invested at the discount rate to be worth the expected 
benefit at the time horizon. The higher the discount rate and the longer the time 
horizon, the smaller the amount of current investment needed. 
Ackerman and Heinzerling provide a simple example. If you had $100 to put 
into your savings account today and the bank offered three percent interest on 
savings, you would have $103 in one year. In order to obtain $100 in a year at a 
three percent discount rate, you would have to deposit only $97.09 today.138 The 
problem, of course, is that the benefits sought to be obtained might not have the 
monetary associations that savings and interest rates do. Moreover, given the 
absence of current investment in significant behavioral change, life on earth is 
likely to change dramatically for the worse or, perhaps, end due to environmental 
degradation. What is the appropriate discount rate to avoid that prognosis? 
It is also important to recognize that the benefits from environmental 
regulation (or the provision of additional affordable housing) are not static. They 
continue indefinitely into the future and are, let us posit for this example, 
fundamental for societal wellbeing. By discounting the benefits, we risk that they 
do not exceed the costs, thus thrusting on future generations the harms that we 
could have avoided today. This problem seems not to be susceptible to a standard 
Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
2. The moral critique 
This section, which I have headed as “The moral critique,” is really about 
several different kinds of problems. At a very basic level, it is about the morality 
of reducing matters such as human life and suffering, species extinction, and 
environmental degradation to monetary terms. At another level, one might ask the 
question of how important equity is in our societal makeup. At yet another level is 
the question of how to prioritize incommensurable social goods. Each of these 
problems has an impact on the value of CBA. 
For decades now, economists have utilized the value of a statistical life (VSL) 
to determine damages in tort actions and for plugging into CBAs.139 Proponents 
                                                               
138. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1559. 
139. Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & Christopher Woock, The Value of a Statistical Life: 
Evidence from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74, 75 (2012).  
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have argued that such a calculation is necessary for efficient outcomes in 
regulatory governance and compensatory measurements.140 Others have qualms 
about making such a calculation. In one example of such a qualm, Thomas 
McGarity quotes Professor Douglas McClean that “[t]o assign . . . exchange value 
to such benefits is to treat them as commodities when they should really have a 
different kind of value—a sacred value perhaps—and should be regarded as 
such.”141 
McGarity goes on to question how members of society would react to a study 
that concluded the costs of treating handicapped infants with a birth weight of less 
than 900 grams exceeded a surviving child’s potential lifetime income as 
discounted to present value.142 Taking the example further, what is the value of 
treating terminally ill patients? Should we be looking at a CBA to make such 
decisions? Many in society might say we should not. Ackerman and Heinzerling 
point out that human life is not a commodity despite the implicit meaning 
embedded in the idea of the VSL.143 They point out that one cannot buy the right 
to kill someone by giving that person the equivalent of the VSL, nor can the holder 
of a life sell it.144 There is, for some, a repugnance to the commodification of 
human life. 
On the question of equity, I have already argued that in a society in which 
people have widely disparate resources, an assessment of the value of a benefit 
based on what one would pay to obtain it is a poor proxy for the actual value of 
that benefit.145 There are distributional starting points and distributional end points 
that make CBAs problematic. As a starting point, people with more resources can 
spend more to obtain desired benefits or to avoid undesired costs. The NIMBY 
phenomenon, discussed in Part II.B.3, supra, is an illustration of this distributional 
effect. Can it be said that the poor are less concerned with the placement of a toxic 
dump in their neighborhood than the wealthy? Surely not, yet because the wealthy 
have more money to spend to avoid such risks, dumps are disproportionately 
placed in poorer neighborhoods. That siting imposes additional harms on an 
already distressed segment of society. Looking again to Ackerman and Heinzerling 
concerning public policy choices: 
There is an important difference between spending state tax 
revenues to improve the parks in rich communities and spending 
the same revenues to clean up pollution in poor communities. The 
value of these two initiatives, measured using cost-benefit 
analysis, might be the same in both cases, but this does not mean 
that the two policies are equally urgent or desirable.146 
                                                               
140. Id. at 74–75; W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review 
of Market Estimates Throughout the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9487, 
2003).  
141. McGarity, supra note 124, at 63. 
142. Id. 
143. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1564. 
144. Id. 
145. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
146. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1574. 
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The question that society is being asked to resolve is how to choose between 
incommensurable options. CBA advocates argue, often strenuously, for an 
economic analysis.147 Reduce all costs and benefits to monetary terms and there 
will be an objective and impartial answer. Of course, for the reasons already 
presented, this latter claim is incorrect. There are value judgments in privileging 
economic efficiency over other possible social goals. There are also value 
judgments in applying dollar amounts to intangible benefits and in making choices 
between options that have equal economic feasibility. The idea of political impact 
cannot be removed from what are, at least in our society, essentially political 
choices. 
IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING, CBA, AND THE CONFLICT OF COMPETING GOODS 
In this part, I argue that affordable housing is one of the societal choices about 
which CBA should be a secondary (at best) concern. I will also point out why it is 
not. Despite the questionable value of using CBA for determining the efficacy of 
a policy promoting more affordable housing, I argue that doing so would meet 
CBA requirements. I then offer a financing mechanism that would support the 
effort.  
A. Affordable Housing Should Be a Peremptory Goal of Society 
Housing has a central role in our society. It is the hub of our existence and 
provides a basis for shelter, comfort, safety, and social life. It is a source of identity 
and of wealth. It is a significant factor in our health, well-being, and employment 
and educational activities.148 Because of this centrality, decent affordable housing 
should be available to all members of society. But it is not. Tens of millions of 
people lack such housing and are either homeless, cost burdened, or live in 
substandard or over-crowded units.149 
The overall budget for the United States is approximately $4.4 trillion.150 
Budget, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
To 
get an idea of how affordable housing fits into our national policy and budgetary 
priorities, the federal government spends approximately $50 billion annually151 for 
affordable housing or just over one percent. This is in a nation that is at least eight 
million units short of what is needed to adequately and affordably house the 
nation’s poorest residents. 152  
                                                               
147. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018). 
148. Diamond & Byrne, supra note 40, at 527. 
149. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. Aurand’s estimated shortfall is for extremely low-income 
households, those below 30% of the Area Median Income (AMI). There is also a shortage of units for very 
low-income households (up to 50% of AMI); low-income households (80% of AMI); and workforce 
housing (120% of AMI). Id. 
150. 
                                                          
While this number of units could not, either 
physically or financially, be provided all at once, a phased-in process of whittling 
down the shortage surely could be undertaken. 
151. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 47.  
152. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
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Harken back to the example offered by Ackerman and Heinzerling about the 
dichotomy between providing for the improvement of parks in wealthier 
neighborhoods or the clean-up of environmental hazards in poorer ones.153 In their 
example, CBA fails to resolve the problem of which to choose assuming only one 
could be chosen. Extrapolating from that hypothetical choice, society has made a 
series of actual choices that raise similar questions. These run a broad gamut from 
tax cuts to border walls, each choice reallocating governmental revenues away 
from certain governmental functions and towards others. These choices are 
political and in the most benevolent way they could be understood as the outcome 
of a conflict of competing goods. Less benevolently, they might be attributed to 
public choice, that is, to legislators voting in ways that are most likely to keep them 
in office.154 Since contributions to campaigns and, to a great extent, voter turnout 
come predominantly from wealthier people and organizations, for most of whom 
affordable housing is generally not a priority (and some of whom actually oppose 
it),155 one can see why there is a lack of urgency to solve this problem. 
B. Affordable Housing Might Pay for Itself 
While my fundamental position is that society has an obligation to provide 
decent affordable shelter for its low-income households, that position has had little 
traction with policy makers over the past half century. Because there is a lack of 
moral impetus and political will to provide more affordable housing, I have turned 
to a different kind of argument as to why society should provide it—CBA. The 
argument is that affordable housing could pay for itself through a combination of 
direct savings to government and benefits, both tangible and intangible, to private 
interests, some portion of which would be captured by the government through 
taxation. 
I have already pointed out many of the areas of societal harms that could be, 
at least partially, addressed by more affordable housing.156 I offered some idea of 
the magnitude of the social loss that is correlated with the absence of sufficient 
numbers of affordable housing units.157 Some of the gains are measurable, like the 
benefits derived from better health and, to some extent, better education and 
through gains in employment and productivity. Others are not as easily measured, 
such as an increased sense of well-being, self-esteem, and confidence for newly-
housed individuals. 
                                                               
153. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1574. 
154. Diamond, supra note 2, at 1008. 
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
156. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
157. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
                                                          
While there is a strong correlation between the absence of decent affordable 
housing and losses in health, education, employment and productivity, and the 
increased costs associated with policing, criminal justice, incarceration, and 
sanitation, there is not a direct causative link between the absence of housing and 
these harms. But to take a page from Cass Sunstein’s playbook, we might assign 
some percentage of these harms as being caused by the lack of enough affordable 
158. 
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housing.158 
Cass R. Sunstein, Nonquantifiable 9–12 (June 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259279).  
The eliminated costs and the social gains would recur annually and 
would increase as more affordable housing entered the market. Similarly, the 
resulting private gains would recur and grow as would the tax revenue as a result 
of such gains. The housing, as a durable asset, would remain indefinitely as an 
accretion to societal wealth. 
C. Financing the Housing 
The production of housing is both a time and capital-intensive undertaking. 
The size of the affordable housing deficit indicates that vast sums would be needed 
to close the gap. Even the federal government is unlikely to be able to finance the 
construction or renovation of the necessary units over a short time. Yet government 
need not carry the full burden of such a program. As of 2019 there is in excess of 
fifteen trillion dollars in mortgage debt outstanding in the United States.159 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/mortoutstand/current.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).  
The 
vast bulk of that financing comes from private sources rather than government. 
The private market, banks, insurance companies, real estate investment trusts, and 
other private institutions are capable of financing significant numbers of affordable 
units on an annual basis. What keeps them from doing so is the greater risk 
associated with financing affordable housing and the absence of incentivized 
developers to produce it. If the government incentivizes the lenders and 
developers, there is no economic reason why the housing should not be built. 
Developers of housing, as do most other businesses, seek the highest returns 
relative to risk. In housing, the risks are higher and the returns are lower for 
affordable housing than for market rate housing. Therefore, most developers will 
not produce affordable housing.160 As part of a response to that problem, Congress 
created the Section 8 Program.161 For the fiscal year 2020, the federal government 
has budgeted in excess of thirty billion for rent subsidies under the Housing Choice 
Voucher and the Section 8 programs.162 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF 6 (2020), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/HUD2020BudgetinBrief03072019Final.pdf.  
If this amount were increased significantly 
and made project-based (meaning the subsidy would remain with the project for a 
defined number of years and could be renewed), the economic disincentive of 
developers would be largely ameliorated. 
Lenders could be incentivized to lend for affordable housing construction and 
renovation and for permanent mortgages by an expansion in size and scope of an 
already existing set of programs which guarantee to lenders the repayment of 
mortgage debt upon the default of mortgage borrowers. As of fiscal year 2017, the 
fund that supports the guarantees is about two percent of outstanding insured 
159. 
160. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
161. This program was added to The National Housing Act of 1937 in 1974. See Housing Choice 
Voucher Program, Pub. L. No. 93–383, § 201(8), 88 Stat. 633, 662–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f (2012)). 
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mortgages.163 Therefore, between an expanded rent subsidy program and mortgage 
guaranty program, the government could leverage the benefits to be derived from 
the provision of more affordable housing to be built and operated by the private 
sector. 
This is not to say that there are not problems other than economic ones that 
constrain the development of affordable housing. There still needs to be a social 
incentive to provide it and to prioritize such investments over other possible uses 
of resources. The economic argument has been used, often as a mask for other 
objections, to repel demands to produce more housing. What I have tried to do here 
is provide a mechanism to help reduce, as much as possible, the economic 
argument against producing housing.  
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                                         
163 . KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FHA SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE: 
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND (MMI FUND) 20 (2018). 
Because there are many social goods that need to be achieved and finite and 
inadequate governmental resources available to achieve them, society is 
confronted with the conflict of competing goods. When there is not a principled 
system for choosing among those goods, choices are made by the exercise of 
power, sometimes subtly and sometimes not. The theory presented here is that the 
conflict might be avoided when there is a way to make achieving the good 
economically resource neutral—to make the benefits derived from providing it 
equal the costs of doing so. I hypothesize that would be the case with government 
support for producing more affordable housing.  
